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Policy Points:
 There is growing understanding of how manufacturers of harmful
products influence health policy. The strategies, approaches, and in-
fluences from such manufacturers that are detrimental to health have
been termed the “corporate” or “commercial” determinants of health.
However, while partnerships with the tobacco industry are clearly unac-
ceptable for public health organizations, ties to other industries continue
to be pursued.
 Such partnerships may influence health organizations in a number of
ways detrimental to population health. However, with the exception of
tobacco industry tactics as revealed by internal documents, we know
relatively little about how this influence operates.
 This article uses emails between the Coca-Cola Company and the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, which we obtained through
Freedom of Information Act requests, to explore the nature of corpo-
rate influence, conflicts of interest, and lobbying “in their own words,”
and highlights the need for greater transparency and clearer policies on
engaging with such industries.
Context: There is a continuing debate about the appropriateness of contacts
between manufacturers of some harmful products and health researchers, as
well as practitioners and policymakers. Some argue that such contacts may be a
means of exerting undue influence, while others present them as an opportunity
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to pursue shared health goals. This article examines interactions between the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Coca-Cola Com-
pany (Coca-Cola) as revealed by communications obtained through Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests.
Methods: We sent 10 US FOIA requests in 2016/2017 for communications
between employees at the CDC and Coca-Cola. We then performed a thematic
content analysis of the documents provided.
Findings: Of our 10 FOIA requests, 3 requests are still pending (at the time
of this publication); 5 were rejected as too broad or because no records were
found; and 3 returned 295 pages from 86 emails. The CDC withheld 102
pages to “protect commercial or financial information which is privileged or
confidential.” The returned emails demonstrate three main themes in Coca-
Cola’s contact with CDC employees: to gain and expand access, to lobby, and
to shift attention and blame away from sugar-sweetened beverages.
Conclusions: The emails we obtained using FOIA requests reveal efforts by
Coca-Cola to lobby the CDC to advance corporate objectives rather than health,
including to influence the World Health Organization. Our findings provide
a rare example of the ways in which corporate interests attempt to influence
public health practitioners “in their own words,” and they demonstrate a need
for clearer policies on avoiding partnerships with manufacturers of harmful
products.
Keywords: commercial determinants of health, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, government transparency, public health.
A lthough there is widespread agreement about theimportance of not engaging with the tobacco industry, inter-actions between health researchers, practitioners, and policy-
makers and the manufacturers of other potentially harmful products
are controversial. While some see such interactions as a means to pro-
mote dialogue and reduce harm, others draw attention to the influence
that these manufacturers exert, for example, through their funding of
academic research.1-5 There is also growing concern that nonfinancial
influence is perhaps just as important, even though it may be harder to
detect. Corporations may seek to reframe policy debates, build oppos-
ing constituencies, and lobby politicians to avert public health policies
that could undermine their profits.6 An Australian study showed how
the Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) and other companies frame obe-
sity debates as being predominantly about individuals and exercise.7
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The now-defunct Global Energy Balance Network (GEBN), a US-based
group that focused on lack of exercise as the primary driver of obesity,
was disbanded after the media revealed Coca-Cola’s involvement.8,9
Such strategies may complement traditional lobbying activities, such
as blocking taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs).10
Concerns regarding the breadth and potency of such corporate strate-
gies have contributed to an increase in research on what are termed the
“corporate determinants of health,”11 including describing how manu-
facturers of harmful products and activities—such as tobacco, alcohol,
and gambling—use similar language and tactics when faced with poli-
cies that threaten their profits.12,13 This research calls for caution in all
interactions with these industries, highlighting the risks of corporate
access to and influence on public health organizations. As we noted,
however, this is not a universal view, and achieving consensus is made
more difficult by the relative lack of knowledge of the nonfinancial
influence of these corporate actors, with the exception of the tobacco
industry, for which we now have a greater evidence base.
Ideally, information on interactions between public bodies and indus-
try should be transparent, with legislators signaling their commitment
to this principle by passing freedom-of-information laws. Yet in prac-
tice, it can be difficult to discover what is happening behind closed
doors. We illustrate these challenges by means of a case study, in which
we describe the challenges in obtaining information about interactions
between two leading players on different sides of the obesity debate in
the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
and Coca-Cola.
This case study is of particular relevance because the CDC has recently
faced criticism for its links to manufacturers of unhealthy products,
especially those of SSBs.14-16 In 2016, Barbara Bowman, director of the
CDC’s Division for Heart Disease and Stroke Prevention, resigned after
emails between her and a former Coca-Cola executive were disclosed.15
The emails, obtained from a Colorado Open Records Act request to the
University of Colorado, showed that Bowman had advised the former
Coca-Cola and industry association executive on how to influence the
director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO) to stop
promoting taxes on sugar.14-16 Brenda Fitzgerald, who was appointed
in July 2017 to head the CDC, had previously been commissioner of
the Georgia Department of Public Health from 2011 to 2017, during
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which time she accepted a US $1 million donation from Coca-Cola for
Georgia Shape, a childhood obesity initiative.15
Corporations and individuals may contribute to the CDC either di-
rectly or indirectly, via the National Foundation for the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC Foundation), a nonprofit orga-
nization established by Congress in 1992 “to support and carry out
activities for the prevention and control of diseases . . . and for pro-
motion of public health.”17 Coca Cola’s transparency website reports
that between 2010 and 2015, the company donated more than US $1
million to the CDC Foundation, primarily to “build global capacity
for NCD prevention.”18 The foundation’s own records report additional
gifts from Coca-Cola in 201619 and 2017,20 although they do not ap-
pear on Coca-Cola’s transparency website.18 The potential challenges in
operating such a foundation were made clear in the bill establishing
the CDC Foundation, in which Congress instructed it to prepare by-
laws to ensure that its activities would not “compromise, or appear to
compromise, the integrity of any governmental program or any officer
or employee involved in such program.”17 While the CDC Foundation
website refers to processes that “safeguard against potential conflicts of
interest,”21 concerns remain that such funding may affect research and
policy. Indeed, studies reporting funding by the SSB industry are sig-
nificantly more likely to find no association between the consumption
of SSBs and obesity.22 Moreover, even when researchers have received
funding from Coca-Cola, not all their papers report this conflict of
interest.1
In this article, we examine interactions between the CDC and Coca-
Cola using Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. We used
these requests to reveal exchanges between the CDC and Coca-Cola “in
their own words,” enabling us to examine the attempts by Coca-Cola–
affiliated individuals to influence the CDC and the CDC Foundation on
this controversial subject.
Methods
U.S. Right to Know (USRTK), a nongovernmental organization that
investigates the food and agrichemical industries, made a series of FOIA
requests for correspondence between employees at the CDC and the
CDC Foundation and current or former employees of Coca-Cola or the
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International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI). Both individuals and
organizations can obtain records from federal agencies unless one of nine
exemptions applies, relating to issues such as national security, breach
of other federal laws, trade secrets, and invasion of privacy. We made 10
requests between June 26, 2016, and August 15, 2017, for communi-
cations between January 1, 2011, and the time of the request between
named staff at the CDC and the CDC Foundation and Coca-Cola or the
ILSI. ILSI is an organization that receives funding from Coca-Cola, was
founded by a Coca-Cola executive, and was involved in the CDC media
coverage mentioned earlier. Some of the responses led to follow-up
requests.
We read the documents received in the order of their date, and a qual-
itative researcher interpreted and thematically coded them. Our choice
of themes was inductive, based on a framework developed to examine the
political activities of the food industry6 and informed by research on the
tobacco industry’s documentation.23-26 The coding was iterative, allow-
ing us to adapt the framework to reflect emerging corporate strategies.
We present here illustrative quotations relating to each activity identi-
fied; the online supplementary material includes all the documents we
obtained. We further compare these documents to the 2014 CDC ethics
guidelines, which state that interactions between the CDC and private
entities must be based on “mutual, explicit and transparent benefits for
all partners.”27 The guidelines also state that staff considering a part-
nership must ask whether “partnering with the private entity presents a
conflict of interest (real or perceived).”27
Results
FOIA Response Rate
Figure 1 shows the time line of our FOIA requests. As shown, response
times varied significantly, from less than two weeks to several months.
Three of our requests were initially rejected as being too broad (although
the scope of all our requests was similar), and two returned no records.
At the time of writing (two years later), three of our requests are still
pending. Three of our requests returned 295 pages of communications
from 86 emails. The CDC further withheld 105 pages of communica-
tions, including 102 pages on the grounds of 5 USC §552(b)(4) (which
protects privileged or confidential commercial or financial information).
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Figure 1. Time Line of FOIA Requests to the CDC Regarding Specific
Employees’ Contacts With Coca-Cola or the International Life Sciences
Institute and the CDC’s Subsequent Responses
Thematic Analysis of Email Documents
The emails offer examples of Coca-Cola’s successful efforts to gain access,
lobby policymakers, and frame the debate on diet and obesity. Given the
small number of FOIA requests generating material, we report findings
by activity, using illustrative quotations.
Theme 1: Gaining Access and Influence. The emails we obtained in-
dicate that former Coca-Cola staff attempted to meet with CDC staff
members in order to build relationships with them. Accordingly, on
April 3, 2013, Rhona Applebaum, then Coca-Cola’s chief science and
health officer and an architect of the Global Energy Balance Network,8
contacted the CDC’s Janet Collins:
Heartfelt congratulations on being named Director of The Division of
Nutr [sic], Physical Activity and Obesity at CDC. Once settled would
welcome the opportunity to come by and discuss current activities
and what more can be done.
Collins replied:
Thanks Rhona. I am delighted to have joined the Division. I have
some international travel coming up through mid-April but would
be happy to meet after that. (Supplementary file 1)
Such contacts also enabled the strengthening of institutional ties. On
October 27, 2014, Collins asked Applebaum:
Conversations Between Coca-Cola and the CDC 7
I hope you don’t mind if I share the fact that a CDC colleague of mine
(Maureen Culbertson) is very interested in working at Coca-Cola . . .
she would be great for external and governmental relations especially
on food, beverage and physical activity policy as well as corporate
philanthropy.
Applebaum replied:
Many thanks for the CV. I will share internally. (Supplementary file 1)
Emails between Barbara Bowman, then director of the CDC’s Division
for Heart Disease and Stroke Prevention, and Alex Malaspina, a former
Coca-Cola senior vice president of external affairs and the founding
president of ILSI, show their efforts to expand access to and influence at
the CDC. On September 22, 2014, Malaspina wrote:
I was very impressed with all you have accomplished and your new
responsibilities. I always had such faith in your abilities and your great
knowledge in nutrition. I would very much like to see you again
and also introduce you to a very delightful and intelligent young
lady from Kenya [WamwariWaichungo, Coca-Cola vice president for
global scientific and regulatory affairs], who for the last year has had
my old job at Coke, as Head of SRA. . . . How is your schedule? If
you agree, give me some dates and I will arrange for a nice dinner for
the three of us.
Bowman responded:
I’d love to see you and to meet Wamwary [sic] Waichungo! . . .
looking forward to getting together. (Supplementary file 2)
This networking subsequently expanded, as following up to arrange
the suggested meeting. Malaspina wrote on November 21, 2014, asking
to include more Coca-Cola executives in the meeting:
Is it OK with you, if I also invite two close friends, who would like to
meet you. One is Clyde Tuggle, Senior VP in charge of Public Affairs.
The other is Ed Hays, who is in charge of Science. (Supplementary
file 2)
Later Bowman wrote:
What a lovely time we had on Saturday nights [sic], many thanks,
Alex, for your hospitality. (Supplementary file 2)
Theme 2: Framing Debates on Nutrition, Artificial Sweeteners, and Obe-
sity. We found evidence that meetings between the staffs of the two
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organizations enabled their sharing of information, although the emails
cannot capture the full scope of such meetings. At least one visit was
arranged for CDC staff to visit Coca-Cola’s headquarters to “provide an
overview of OMHHE’s [Office of Minority Health and Health Equity’s]
priorities, and share other collaborations between the CDC Foundation
and Coca Cola” (Supplementary file 3).
Coca-Cola staff sent follow-up messages suggesting that the meeting
was
helpful to understand your areas of focus and where we may have
mutual interests. There are clearly areas where we can work collab-
oratively and share insights to advance the work in prevention of
obesity and inform of [sic] the consumer of choices. We valued get-
ting to know you and your team better and enjoyed the rich discussion
relating to your main initiatives. Susan [Roberts, then Coca-Cola’s di-
rector of Nutrition in Global Scientific and Regulatory Affairs] will
be sharing with you further the work on the low and no calorie bever-
age research and will follow-up as more of the data become publically
available.We can also forward the papers on the scientific method and
interpretation of the epidemiological studies as per our discussion and
impact of heterogeneity. It would be helpful to have another meeting
in the future to follow-up on the key discussions on methods and
interventions, especially with regards to the fortification programs
and grocery channels. (Supplementary file 3)
Subsequent emails from Coca-Cola regarding this meeting make clear
that evidence supportive of Coca-Cola products was being shared. An
example is the focus on low-calorie sweeteners, with Coca-Cola’s staff
claiming in correspondence that “associations between diet beverages
and weight in the epidemiological studies is likely the result of re-
verse causality.” Coca-Cola’s staff also shared a then-advance copy of a
Coca-Cola–funded publication on heterogeneity in research methods as
a reason for the overestimation of SSB-related diabetes risk in pooled
estimates, suggesting that “in many studies adjustment for covariates
explained half to all of the association between SSB and T2D.”28 This is
an instance of Coca-Cola’s using research it funded to influence the CDC
staff’s perceptions of obesity challenges and likely solutions. Subsequent
emails show that these publications were also disseminated among other
CDC staff (Supplementary file 3).
Theme 3: Helping Coca-Cola Lobby WHO. Emails exchanged between
June 25 and 27, 2015, between Bowman and Malaspina reveal how
Coca-Cola used its contacts inside both the CDC and academia to avert
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potential business threats, through an exchange previously reported in
the print media. On June 25, 2015, Malaspina referred to a news report
from an internal Coca-Cola mailing list regarding Margaret Chan, then
the WHO’s director-general, in which she invokes SSB producers as
contributors to global obesity and backs restrictions on the consumption
of full-sugar soft drinks. Malaspina forwarded this report to Coca-Cola
staff, academics, and former ILSI officials, stating: “Please see report
on WHO. This is getting a lot of publicity. We must find a way of
some one [sic] such as a famous scientist [to] arrange to pay her a visit.
Maybe Jim Hill or someone of similar stature or a US government
scientist.” James Hill, a prominent researcher formerly at the University
of Colorado Denver, now at the University of Alabama at Birmingham,
and a member of the National Academy of Sciences, was among the
recipients of this message (Supplementary file 2).
Malaspina described his successful experiences as president of ILSI
with lobbying former WHO directors-general, including alongside the
future president of Coca-Cola, E. Neville Isdell, before concluding: “In
summary I am suggesting that collectively we must find a way to start
a dialogue with Dr. Chen [sic]. If not, she will continue to blast us with
significant negative consequences on a global basis. This threat to our
business is serious. Warmest Regards, Alex” (Supplementary file 2).
Malaspina then forwarded this message to the CDC’s Bowman:
Dear Barbara: How are you? Are you having a nice summer? Any ideas
on how to have a conversation with WHO? Now, they do not want
to work with industry. Who finds all the new drugs? Not WHO, but
industry. She is influenced by the Chinese Govt [sic] and is against
US. Something must be done. (Supplementary file 2)
Bowman responded the same day:
Am wondering wether [sic] anyone with ILSI China, perhaps Madame
Chen, might have ideas. Another thought, perhaps someone with con-
nections to the PEPFAR [US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief] program. Or Gates and Bloomberg people, many have close
connections with theWHO regional offices. Perhaps an issue of defin-
ing legacy. (Supplementary file 2)
After exchanging emails about the nature of PEPFAR and ILSI China,
Malaspina wrote:
Dear Barbara, you gave some very good leads. I like the one especially
about having Mr. Bill Gates help. Our Chairman knows him well.
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I will explore this idea with Clyde [Coca-Cola Senior Vice President
Clyde Tuggle]. We would want WHO to start working with ILSI
again, with the GEBN and with the food industry in general to re-
solve issues of food safety and nutrition and for the WHO to not
only consider sugary foods as the only cause of obesity but to consider
also the life style changes that have been occurring throughout the
universe. Since WHO, as you stated has been helped by the pharma-
ceutical industry to combat HIV/AIDs, why not work closely with
the food industry to combat obesity. The Food industry is very willing
to come to the table. Let us have dinner soon. (Supplementary file 2)
Discussion
Records provided by the CDC demonstrate efforts by current and for-
mer Coca-Cola staff to influence the CDC by building relationships,
attempting to frame the debate on the role of SSBs in obesity, and using
existing contacts to lobby decision makers. These activities are con-
sistent with those observed in previous interactions of SSB companies
with policymakers, academia, and the public. Furthermore, these activ-
ities may contravene ethics guidelines for CDC staff, which ask staff to
consider potential conflicts of interest before engaging with potential
partners.27 These guidelines state that the CDC should not engage in
partnerships in which the “potential partner represents any product that
exacerbates morbidity or mortality when used as directed.” In addition,
the CDC’s ethics guidelines on gifts, including those given via the CDC
Foundation, state that the CDC should not accept gifts “if acceptance
of the gift could compromise the integrity of a government program or
any official involved in that program.”29
Yet even though the evidence we obtained does raise important
questions, the process of obtaining it was not straightforward. Several
of our FOIA requests to the CDC were denied as being too broad,
even though the scope of all our FOIA requests was similar, consisting
of communications among named CDC employees, CDC Foundation
employees with CDC email addresses, and staff or email domains from
Coca-Cola or ILSI (some of these outstanding requests are currently the
subject of legal action by U.S. Right to Know). Furthermore, it appears
that in at least some instances, the CDC did not supply records, even
though their existence was confirmed through FOIA requests to other
institutions that were part of the same communication trails. This
finding raises questions regarding the CDC’s transparency with regard
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to connections between CDC staff and Coca-Cola. For example, on
March 29, 2012, Applebaum forwarded research to the CDC’s Michael
Pratt, among others, regarding the health effects of prolonged sitting
and the need to “amplify these messages” (Supplementary file 4).
There also appear to have been ongoing research collaborations involv-
ing Pratt and Coca-Cola. On April 4, 2012, Pratt wrote to Applebaum
and others to express his concern that Mexico was being dropped from
the International Study of Childhood Obesity, Lifestyle and the Envi-
ronment (ISCOLE), to which Applebaum replied:
Mike—from what was explained to me and during the BtD
Symposium—They don’t appear to understand the importance of
routine and discipline as it relates to the data. It’s not a “manana”
[sic] exercise—it’s a “today” requirement. They didn’t seem to get it
despite outreach from the PI’s. (Supplementary file 5)
These examples, obtained from a Louisiana Public Records Act request
to Louisiana State University, suggest that there were indeed emails
between Pratt and Coca-Cola that should have been available via FOIA to
the CDC but were not provided. The reasons for this are unclear. Despite
the importance of transparency in interactions between a leading public
health agency and a manufacturer of SSBs, several of our FOIA requests
elicited no documents (in some cases, not even a response), even after
appeals and timely responses for additional information. Our experience
raises questions about how effective the legislation designed to ensure
transparency actually is.
One particular email exchange sheds light on the seriousness with
which the industry takes the threat of taxing SSBs and the possibility
that ongoing relationships between the CDC and SSB companies could
alleviate this threat. Alex Malaspina described Margaret Chan’s support
of a sugar tax as a “global threat to our business.” This statement, while
striking, is consistent with Coca-Cola’s communications to shareholders
in its annual reports, which make clear that “possible new or increased
taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages to reduce consumption or to raise
revenue . . . could adversely affect our profitability.”30 Malaspina then
asked for and received advice from a senior CDC contact on how to
arrange a meeting with Margaret Chan in order to influence her. This
interaction is a troubling example of the core conflict of interest between
these two parties, in that the CDC exists to promote public health, while
Coca-Cola exists to maximize profits. In the United States, taxation
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targeting diet could substantially reduce the burden of cardiovascular
disease and diabetes,31,32 a conclusion supported by a growing body of
evidence that has led the WHO to recommend implementing a “sugar
tax” as part of a comprehensive obesity strategy, with a goal of increasing
SSB prices by 20%.33
As a content analysis of FOIA-sourced documentation, our research
has several important limitations. In order to ensure the validity of our
findings,34 we have attempted to account for personal biases by reporting
all the emails in the online supplementary material so that our interpre-
tations are accessible to all readers and by quoting as much as possible
directly from the emails, along with providing information about dates.
We have acknowledged potential biases in sampling due to the nature of
the data collection methods (FOIA), including the information that the
CDC has not yet provided a full response to some of our FOIA requests.
We structured our analysis into the main emerging themes in an open
process. To ensure reproducibility, we engaged in regular discussions
with colleagues working on the corporate determinants of health. Al-
though respondent validation can be an important way of confirming
findings, this would not be feasible in our case because of the possible
incentives for those involved to conceal their activities.
Our analysis is, by nature, not comprehensive, relying only on FOIA
requests that have resulted in returned emails. This is therefore not
necessarily indicative of any broader activity between CDC staff and
Coca-Cola, but it is sufficient to reveal the CDC staff’s allowing con-
flicted corporate actors to engage in well-established tactics to further
commercial goals, something that should not occur in an organization
established to protect public health. Taken together with the recent
resignation of the head of the CDC over purchases of tobacco stock and
conflicting financial interests,35 such findings should be cause for a re-
evaluation of the CDC’s approach, as well as of the nature and purpose
of the CDC Foundation, so that it cannot be a vehicle for corporate
influence, particularly considering that unhealthy diets are major risk
factors for noncommunicable diseases,36 with SSB producers identified
among the major drivers of these diseases globally.12
It is unacceptable for public health organizations to engage in part-
nerships with companies that have such a clear conflict of interest. The
obvious parallel would be to consider the CDC’s working with cigarette
companies and the dangers that such a partnership would pose. Our anal-
ysis has highlighted the need for organizations like the CDC to ensure
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that they refrain from engaging in partnerships with harmful product
manufacturers,3 lest they undermine the health of the public they serve.
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